RECENT CASES
Ao;i.-Ncy-ToR'rs-Isi-:eiVER.s-The plaintiff was injured as the result
of a defective -ideu~alk on preni-es belhn.",ing to the defendant company, but
under tiledirect management of its receiver. Pecoverv was refused on the
principle that a rt-ceiver is an officer of the court and not the agent of him whose
property he holds. Carlow v. City Savings Bank, 137 N. W. Rep. 852 (Neb.,
1912).

A receiver is an indifferent person between the parties to a cause, appointed
by the court to receive and preserve the property or fund in litigation, pendente
life, when it (toes not seem reasonable for either party to hold it. lie is not
the agent or representative of either party to the action, but is uniformly regarded as the officer of the court. Williamson v. l.ehman-l)urr Co., 136 Ala.
467 (1902). This definition shows the usual construction given to the position
of a receiver in American courts. An exception is made to the general doctrine
that a receiver is not an agent where it is the party surrendering the property'
who asks for his appointment. Under such conditions, the receiver may be
held to be the agent of the owner of the property. Texas & Pacific R. R. v.
Gav, 26 S. V. Rep. 599 (Tex., 1983). The distinction is made on the ground
that in the one case the owner is compelled to surrender his property, while in the
other it is an entirely voluntary act. Another exception is made in Louisiana,
where, if members of a partnership ask for tile
appointment of a receiver to wind
ilt ) the partnership affairs, he is held their agent, hi- appointment being considered the act of the parties rather than the act of the court. Kellar v. Williams, 3 Rob. 321 (L.a., 1843).
In England, the receiver, when appointed by the court is not looked upon
so much as a servant of the court, but as a principal conducting a business by
order of the court.. Consequently he is unlimitedly liable in the conduct of the
business unless such personal liability has been excluded by so stating at the
comnienceieiit of the receivership or by so inferring from the surrounding circumstances. Re Glasdis Copper Mines, (19o6) t Cr. 365; but a receiver who carries on a business for the benefit of mortgagees has been held their agent. Whimrev v. Moss Steamship Co. Limited, 2 K. 13. 8t3 (1910). Where power of appointment of a receiver had been granted in the mortgage deed to trustees, the
receiver was held the agent of mortgagor. Gosling v. Gaskill, (1897) A. C. 575BANKS A\D BANKING--Foi.LOWING TRUST FUND -the A bank, when insolvent, borrowed money from the B bank on false representations which amounted to fraud. It used the money in the ordinary course of business in paying
checks. In an action by the B bank to follow the money loaned as a trust fund
in the hands of the receiver of the A bank, it was held that the B bank had no
prior claim before the other creditors, since the money could not be traced into
specific property or funds. Bellevue State Bank v. Coffin, i25 Pac. Rep. 816
(Idaho, 1912).
The weight of authority is that when deposits are received by a bank,
known by its officers to be insolvent, the title to the money pakses to the bank,
but such receipt of money, being a fraud on the depositor, renders the bank or
its assignee a trustee ex nakeficio and the deposit a trust fund, recoverable by the
depositor. Cragie v. Hadley, 99 N. Y. 131 (1885); Corn, etc. Bank v. Solicitors' Co., 88 Ia. 33o (1898). Like any other trust fund, if it can be traced and
is capable of identification, it may be recovered from an assignee of the insolvent
bank. If it is a depozit of a check or draft, remaining uncollected in the hands
of the receiver, it may lie reclaimed. First Nat. Bank v. Strauss, 66 Miss. 479
(t888). If it has been collected, the proceeds form a trust fund recoverable from
the receiver of the bank. Higgins v. Hayden, 53 Neb. 61 (1897). If the money
has been invested, the ces!ui que trust may fix the character of the original fund
on the property. Burnham v. Barth, 89 XXis. 362 (1894).
Where the bank has mingled such funds with the mass of its other funds,
the question arises as to what identification of the trust fund is necessary, on
(2O0)

RECENT CASES
which point there is great conflict of authority. The early English cases held
that money having no earmarks was incapable of identification when mingled
with other fund,. I)eg V. l)eg. 2 P. Vis. 414 (1727). But it is now well settled
in England and this country that there need Ibe no identification of the identical
coins, and the mere fact that there has been a mingling with other coins is not
of itself sufficient to bar recovery by the ccstui que trust. Knatchbill V. Iallett,
I.. R. 13 (Ih. l)iv. 696 (it8o); Plano .Mfg. Co. v. Auld, 14 S. Dak. 512 (19oi).
There is, however, a line of cases taking the opposite view. Union Nat. Bank v.
Goetz, 138 IL 127 (1891): liggins V. Hayden, .53 Neb. 61 (1897).
By the great weight of authority, the assets of the insolvent bank must have
been actually augmented to the extent of such a trust fund. The trust fund
must be traced into the bank's assets, and it must be shown to have reached the
receiver. Board v. Wilkinson, i19 ,lich. 655 (1899); State v. Foster, 5 Wyo.
199 (1894). If the transaction however amounted to no more than an exchange
of creditors, the mere cancelling of one liability and assumption of another, or,
if the money was used in the discharge of indebtedness, the assets have not been
increased thereby. Insturance Co. v. Caldwell, Kan. 156 (x898).
CoBtNnATIONS

IN

RESTRAINT

OF TRADE-SAI.ES

AGREEMENTS-Yearly

agreements were made between a combination composed of independent firms
engaged in the sugar refining business and their customers, whereby ten cents
per hundred weight was to be returned to the customer provided he dealt exclusively with the combination during the next succeeding year. A purchaser
sought to avoid payment on the ground that he was dealing with a combination in
restraint of trade. Inasmuch as the contract itself was not in restraint of trade,
the seller was allowed to recover the purchase price. Wilder Mfg. Co. v. Corn
Products Refining Co., 75 S. E. Rep. 918 (Ga., 1912).
The doctrine of the principle case is well recognized in prosecutions under
the Act of July 2d, 189 o , c. 647. It is no defence to recovery for the price
of goods that the seller is an illegal combination in restraint of trade. Harrison
v. Glucose Refining Co., i16 Fed. 304 (1902), but where the contract of sale is
part of the illegal scheme to restrain trade, the purchase price of the goods cannot be recovered. Conelly v. Union Sewer Pipe I.ine Co., 184 LT.S. 540 (19o0).
AMere granting of rebates in return for exclusive trade during a limited period is
not in itself such a scheme to restrain trade. In re Corning, Si Fedd. 205 (1893);
In re Greene, 52 Fed. 105 (1893). Yet if the contract itself is illegal the buyer
may not retain the goods and recover the price. Empire Distilling Co. v. McNulta, 77 Fed. 700 (1897).
Where the purchaser who dealt with a corporation was given low profitable
rates in return for exclusive trade and prices were made prohibitive, for a purchaser
who did not deal exclusively with the corporation, there was no violation of the
statute. Whitewell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454 (1904)- Nor was
there a violation in granting an exclusive right to sell the products of a manufacturer, Virtue v. Creamery Package Co., 179 Fed. 115 (1910), nor in an agreement

not to ship any of the purchased products out of a certain state, Phillips v. Solon
Portland Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (19o3). But there is a violation when jobbers purchasing from a corporation agree to resell only at a certain price,
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Voight, 212 U.S. 227 (19o9), and where a combination of manufacturers agree not to sell to another who is in debt to any one of
them. Fred Hkeim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 71 S. W. Rep. 691 (Mo., 1902).
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-In a suit on notes by indorsee against maker, the
defense that the notes were given to the payee for a purpose in violation of a
Federal statute, and that the indorsee had notice of this when he took the notes,
was held good. Bank v. Smith, 125 Pac. Rep. 632 (N. M., 1912).
This merely follows the well-settled rule that an executory contract founded
upon illegal considerations can not be enforced. Wood v. Wood's Est., 69 Pac.
Rep. 981 (Cal., 1902); 1W"ilerx v. Brayzos, 74 Conn. 208 (1901); MCMulta v.
Bank, 45 N. E. Rep. 954 (i1., 1897). And if the contract is executed, the court.
will not relieve the party from loss by having performed it. Richardson v.
Buhr, 77 Alich. 632 (1889). Neither will equity enforce it or relieve the parties.
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Jones v. Redman, 5 Ky. Law Rep. 767 (1884); Bleasdell v. Fowle, 120 Mass.
447 (1876). The law leaves the parties where it finds them, not for the sake of
the party deriving the benefit, but for the law's sake and that only. Attaway
v. Bank, 5 S. W. Rep. i6 (Mo., 1887).
So the party already ben -fited will not be estopped from asserting the illegality of the consideration, for the courts will not permit, directly or indirectly,
an action to be maintained where it is necessary to have recourse to such a con,tract. McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U. S. 639 (1899), limiting Brooks v. Martin,
2 Wall. 70 (U. S., 1863).
It is immaterial whether the offense was malum prohibitum or malum in se.
Haggerty v. St. Louis Ice Co., 143 Mo. 238 (1898).
CONTkACTS-PNALTY OR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES-Where a contract was
entered into for the purchase of a grain elevator and flouring mill for $12,5oo
and the seller further agreed not to re-engage in business for five years "under
penalty of $6,2oo as liquidated damages," such contract must be regarded as
providing a penalty and not liquidated damages. Mount Airy Milling & Grain
Co. v. Runkles, 84 Ati. Rep. 533 (Md., 1912).
Whether an amount stated in a contract is to be regarded as a penalty or
as liquidated damages is not controlled, or indeed necessarily affected, by the
employment of either or bot~h of these terms. Hoagland v. Segur, 38 N. J. L.
236 (1876); Bagley v. Peddie, x6 N. Y. 469 (1857); Sheve v. Brereton, 51 Pa.
188of(1862).
io Mich.
175 (1865);
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parties as gathered from all its provisons, the subject of the contract and its
surroundings, the ease or (diffulty of measuring the breach in damages and the
sum stipulated. Clements-v. Schuylkill River E. S. R. Co., 132 Pa. 445 (189o).
Even where the parties expressly stipulate in the recitals of the contract
that the sum mentioned shall be regarded as liquidated damages and not as a
penalty, or where any other language equally conclusive has been used, the courts
will still hold the question to depend upon the meaning and intent of the parties
as gathered from a full view of the provisions of the contract, the terms used to
express such intent and the peculiar circumstance of the subject matter of the
agreement. Perkins v. Lyman, ix Mass. 76 (814); Chase v. Allan, 79 Mass.
42 (1859); Dakin v. Williams, 17 W\end. 447 (N. Y., 1837); Streeper v. Williams,
48 Pa. 450 (1865).
The tendency and preference of the law is to regard a sum stated to be payable if a contract is not fulfilled as a penalty and not as liquidated damages.
Yet courts endeavor to learn from the subject matter of the contract, the naturk of the stipulations, and the surrounding circumstances, what was the real
intent of the parties, and are governed by such intent. Cushing v. Drew, 97
Mass. 445 (1867).

To determine whether the sum named is intended as a penalty or as liqui-

dated damages, it is necessary to look to the whole instrument, its subject matter,
the ease or difficulty of measuring the breach in damages, and the magnitude of
the stipulated sum, not only as compared with the value of the subject of the
contract, but in proportion to the probable consequences of the breach. Burrill v. Daggett, 77 Me. 545 (1885).
COURTs-AnsExcE OF JUDGE DURI.G THE TRIAL-The judge in a criminal
case, with the consent of both parties, absented himself from the court-room
during a part of the prosecutor's argument, in order to prepare his charge, but
it was held that such absence was not ground for reversal unless the accused was
prejudiced by the absence. Hughes v. State, 149 S. V. Rep. 173 (Tex., 1912).
Ina legal sense the judge of a court is the court and there can be no court without ajudge. Pressley v. Lamb, 105 Ind. 171 (1885);and in felony cases, hispresence is essential to the organization of the court. O'Brien v. People, 17 Colo. 561
The judge should be present during all the stages of the trial. Horne
(1892).
v. Rogers, I1O Ga. 362 (19oo). If it becomes necessary for him to be temporarily absent, he should suspend the proceedings until his return. Well v. O'Hare,
His absence during the examination of a witness or the aro
209 Il1. 627 (1904).
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gument of counsel. or at the handing in of the verdict, is reversible error. People
v. Blackman. 127 Cal. 248 (1899); Stokes v. State, 71 S. W. Rep. 248 (Ark.,
19o2).
But his absence is not reversible error, where he is still within hearing of
the argument or evidence, and where he is in a position to pass on any question
which may arise therein, so that nothing prejudicial may result. Schintz v.
People, 178 I1. 320 (1899); Rowe v. People, z6 Colo. 542 (1899). A temporary
absence of the judge during argument may be waived, and the defendant will
be bound by such waiver in the absence of any prejudice to him. State v.
Hammer, 116 Iowa 284 (1902).
According to the weight of authority, in the prosecution of felonies, thepresence of the judge at all stages of the trial is absolutely e.-sential to its validity,
and his abence from the trial for a considerable length of time without suspending proceedings will vitiate the trial and is reversible-error. Ellerbe V. State,
75 Miss. 522 (1897). In the case of misdemeanors, it has been held that the
judge may give place to another by consent, and if he does so without objection
in advance, consent will be presumed. Ellerbe v. State, 75 Miss. 522 (1897);
Turbeville v. State, 56 Miss. 763 (1879). In civil trials, the absence of the judge
without consent is reversible error in some states. Smith v. Sherwood, 95 Wis. 558
(1897). When, however, no objection is made, it will not generally be reversible;
in order to get a new trial, objection must not only be made, but his absence must
be prejudicial. De Houghnes v. Western Co., 84 S. W. Rep. xo66 (Tex., 19o5).
CRI.MEs-AssAULT AND BATTERY-BURDEN OF PROoF-On an indictment
for assault with a deadly weapon, the prosecution has made out a prima facie
case when it proves that the defendent pointed a cocked pistol at the prosecutor
and advancedtoward him in a threatening manner. The fact that the gun was
unloaded (if such is the fact) is a matter of defence. Territory v. Gomez, 125

Pac. Rep.

702

(Ariz.,

1912).

In another recent case, State v. Yturaspe, 125 Pac. Rep. 802 (Idaho, 1912)
where the defendant was indicted for assault with a deadly weapon the court
held that there must be intent and a present ability to perpetrate the battery and
therefore the jury must believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the gu'n was
loaded.
On the main point, that there can be no assault with a deadly weapon in
pointing an unloaded gun at another, the two eases mentioned above are in accord with each other and the majority of jurisdictions. Regina v. James, I Car
& K. 529 (Eng., 1844); Regina v. Baker, 1 Car & K. 253 (Eng., 1843); State v.
Godfrey,
Ore. 300
(1889); v.
People
v. 78Wells,
i4 (885).
Cal. 138 These
(89o5); ases
Stateshow
v. Sears,
that,
Ala. 463
State;
Chapman
86 Mo. 6917(1885);
unlike the civil action, the525
is nothe
e unlawfully
putting
another
in fear.
held
this was
hand
on the other
although
People v. Lilley, 43 Mich. test(88);
Iowa 126 (859) and in State v. Mitchell, i39.
Io
the test in State v. Shepherd,
unloaded.
was734
theI. gun C.
though 14I
even
a deadlyInweapon
Iowa 455
with(1908).
State v.
Atkinsn,
(1906), it was held
assault
The two principle cases differ from each other on the question as to who holdshall
manner sone
same
the
in
differ
Jurisdictions
proof.
assume the burden of
7
Cal.
29
Jacobs,
v.
People
loaded,
was
weapon
the
ing the state must prove
where all
(866); State v. Napper, 6 Nev. 13 (1870); and others holding that
gun, directhe circumstances are such as would exist if one were using a loaded (if such be
tions to acquit would be error and the fact that the gun was unloaded
the fact) is a matter of defence.
State, 4 Tex. 468 (1874).

State v. Herron, 12 Mont. 230 (1892); Crow v.

CRIMES-INOLUNTARY
MANSLAGIITER-AUTOMOBLEs-Defendant was
indicted and convicted of involuntary manslaughter under a statute which undertakes to make penal the operation of an automobile on the highway ata rate of
speed greater than is reasonable and proper, and upon approaching a crossing
of intersecting highways, at a speed grearthav six miles.asr hour. The court
held that so much of the statute* wiii related'To driving a an unreasonable
speed was too indefinite in its terms to be capable of enforcement, and therefore
void, but the convictions would be upheld on the count for approaching a cross-
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ing at a speed greater than six miles per hour. Hayes v. State, 75 S. E. Rep. 523
(Ga., 1912).
This decision is novel in that all the states have passed similar statutes, and
municipalities, ordinances, regulating the speed of motors and from this decision it would seem unsafe for the prosecution not to include counts for the common law offense. But the better view of the statute is expressed in Schultz v.
State. i3o N. V. Rep. 972 (Neb., 1911), where a conviction under a similar
statute was sustained, holding that the indictment (lid charge a crime and the
statute was not void for unreasonableness. Accord: State v. Watson, 216 Mo.
420

(1909).

The offense would have been manslaughter at common law, for one who with
reckless disregard for the safety of others so negligently drives an auto in a public
street as to cause the death of another is guilty of criminal homicide. State v.
Campbell, 82 Conn. 67! (19o9). An indictment under a statute making it penal
"to ride or drive faster than, a commznon tra'eling pace," was held sufficiently
definite to charge a crime in State v. Smith, 29 R. . 439 (1908).
CRIMES-WILFUL TRESPASS AS A CRIME IN P.NNSmVA.IA-Several persons having been convicted and committed to a county jail for wilful trespass
upon po.,ted land under the Act of April 14, 19o5, Pa. P. L. i69, were summarily
released ly the sheriff. In a criminal prosecution of the sheriff under the Act
of March 31, 186o, Pa. P. L. 382, the majority of the court held wilful trespass
upon posted land to be a public offense or crime within the meaning of the Act
of 186o and that the conviction of the sheriff was therefore legal.- Coin. v.
Shields, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 194 (1912).
At common law trespass, without more, upon realty was not a crime but a
purely civil injury on account of which an action for damages lay. Worrall v.
Rhoads, 2 Whart. 427 (Pa., 1837). But the Act of 1905 now declares this a
public wrong. subject to a penalty. Although in Com. v. Lapempti, 16 Pa.
). R. 403 (19o6), a storekeeper who. went upon such posted land to collect
bills due him from tenants residilig thereon, was held liable, yet a storekeeper
who delivers goods previously orderod to such tenants, having their implied invitation, is not a trespasser within the Act. Coin. v. Burford, 38 Pa. Super.
Ct. 201 (19o9), affirmed in 225 Pa. 93 (i909). But if he go beyond such implied invitation and solicit orders front those to whom he does not deliver at the
time, he is a trespasser to that extent. Com. v. Shapiro, 41 Pa. Super. Ct. 96
(1909). Nor does the Act of May 29, 19o, Pa. P. L. 3o2, providing that "public
fishing shall exist" in navigable streams, give the public a right to fish in a creek
the bed of which is privately owned and posted according to the Act of i9o .
Com. v. Foster; 36 Pa. Super. Ct. 433 (19o8). Although a penal proceeding, it
has'been held not reversible error to bring the proceeding in the name of the prosecutor instead of the Commonwealth to the use of the school district. Tewsbury
v. Miller, 9 Lack. Jur. 262 (Pa., 19o8). The trespass, however, must be wilful;
not every common law trespass will warrant a conviction, as Com. v. Burford,
supra;Com. v. Fluck, 7 Just. L. R. (Somerset Co., Pa., i9o8).
FRAUD ON MARITAL RIGHTS OF A WIFE-In Allen v. Allen, 99 N. E. Rep.
462 (Mass., 1912), the defendant had taken a conveyance of property from a
relative, in consideration of a bond for support. The relative was then being
suied for breach of promise of marriage, and shortly afterward married the complainant in that suit. lie represented to her that he still held the property;
which partly-induced the marriage. It was held that, as there was no agreement
of marriage when the conveyance was made. it was not in fraud* of her marital
rights, and that where, as here, /.here was a valid consideration, she must show
both fraudulent intent of the grantor ind knowledge by the grantee.
The general rule in America is that a voluntary ante-nuptial conveyance by
a husbaild is in fraud of his wife's marital rights and void., Murray v. Murray,
I15 Cal. 260 (1896); Betre v. Beere, 79 Ia. 555 (189o); Smith v. Smith, 6 N. 1.
L. 515 (1847); Thaver v; Wheelock. i4 Vt. 107 (1842); Baird v. Stearne, Is

Phila. 339 (Pa., 1882); Youngs v. Carter, 5o How. Prac. 410 (N. Y., 1875).
Even though in pursuance of a previously formed intent which was not disclosed.
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Brown v. Bronson, 35 Mich. 415 (1877). And though the husband could have
defeated the wife's right of homestead by moving. Arnegaard v. Arnegaard, 7
N. D. 475 (1898).

But the marriage must have been contemplated. Tate v. Tate, j8 N. C.
(1834); Gainor v. Gainor, 26 Ia. 337 (1868). And there must have been anintention to defratud the wife. Ross's Appeal, 127 Pa. 4 (1889).
lowever, a
reasonable proviL.ion for children by another wife is not a fraud on marital
rights, where there is ample provision made for the present wife. Ross's Appeal
supra; Kinne v. Wehb, 54 Fed. 64 (1893); Alkire v. Alkire, 134 Ind. 350 (1892).
Statutes regulating the property rights of hu.;band and wife have weakened
the rule as to fraud on marital rights. Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 4th ed.,
p. 288; Brinkley v. Brinkley, 128 N. C. 503 (1901); Butler v. Butler, 21 Kans.
22

521 (1879).

Property so conveyed will not be followed into the hands of a bona fide
purchaser. Chandler v. Ilollingsworth, 3 Del. Chan. 12o (t867). This last
case contains an excellent outline of the law upon the subject, in England and
America.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYA.NCES-GRANTEE'S

LIABILITY

FOR

RENT-Tate

V.

Saunders, 149 S. XV. Rep. 485 (Mo., 1912), was a dispute as to a building restriction. The owner of the restricted premises fraudulently conveyed them, to avoid
paying the judgment for damages about to be given against him. In an opinion
holding the conveyance void the court decided that the fraudulent grantee
could not be held accountable to the judgment creditor for rents accruing before
the execution sale under the judgment against the grantor.
This is in accord with the better considered cases. A judgment creditor has
no interest in the land other than to sell it. Freeman on judgments, §338; and
can only claim the proceeds of land after it has been sold on his execution. Con.
ard v. Atlantic Co., I Pet. 443 (1828). WVhere there is no secret trust in favor of
the grantor, and the property is subject to execution, the fraudulent grantee is
not accountable for prior rent. Warner v. Blakeman, *43 N. Y. 487 (1868);
Stout v. Phillipi, 41 W. Va. 339 (1895); Robinson v. Stewart, 1o N. Y. 189 (1854);
Ringgold v. Waggoner, 14 Ark. 69 (1853); Higgins v. York, 2 Atkyns 107 (1740);

Jacobs v. Smith, 89 Mo. 673 (i886); State v. McBride, 81 Mo. 349 (1883).
Contra: Kitchell.v. Jack-on, 71 Ala 557 (1882); Parr v. Saunders, ii S. E. Rep.
979 (Va., i88o); Booth v. Wiley, 102 Ills. 84 (1880. W\here there is a secret
trust, the fraudulent grantee is bound for all rents and profits as he merely
represents the debtor. Marshall v. Croom, 60 Ala. 132 (1877); Strikes Case, i
Bland. 57 (Md., 1817).
A creditor may compel a fraudulent grantee to account for rents accruing
after the death of the fraudulent grantor, where there is no property in the
estate. Jones v. McCleod, 61 Ga. 602 (1878); or after the bankruptcy of the
fraudulent grantor. Sands v. Codwise, 4 Johns. 536 (N. Y., 18o8); or from
the time a court of equity sequestrates the property. Flaherty v. Stephenson,
56 XV. Va. t92 (1904). The trustee of an insolvent may have an accounting for
rent due after the estate vests in him. Kipp v. lanna, 2 Bland. 26 (Md., 1820).
The rule of the foregoing cases seems to be that a grantee in fraudof creditors is liable only for rents and profits accruing after his claim of title in himself
has in some way been defeated.
IIIGIHWAYS-LIABILITIES

FOR

I\JtRILS-PERSONAL

ciALs-Smith v. Zimmer, 125 Pac. Rep. 424 (Mont.,

LIABILI.TY
1912) ,

OF OFFI-

recognizes, but

limits rigidly, the right of recovery of one injured through a defect in a highway,
by requiring that the commissioners mnu.,t have actual notice of the defective
condition laid before them at a formal meeting of the Board, inasmuch as what
comes to their individual notice can not be charged against them as official
knowledge. 'The decision is based on Daniels v. Hathaway, 65 Vt. 247 (1892),
but that case, in view of its. peculiar facts, can hardly be said to he an authority
on the question of the liability of officers primarily charged with maintenance of
highway's.

In American jurisdictions the broad right of recovery in favor of travelers
injured through defects in highways is recognized as against officers charged
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with proper maintenance thereof; and having at their command instrumentalitits to rai .e the requisite funds. Tearney v. Smith, 86 III. 392 (1877); War n
v. Clenent, 24 un. 472 (N. Y., 1881). This right is founded upon the obligat n
re-ting upon such officers, arising out of the dtutermination of their powers and
duties in re-5ect to such maintenance, and their acceptance of the office, as deftited bv common law or by statute, or by both. Harris v. Carson, 40 Il. App.
147 (ig93); Hathaway v. flinton. 46 N. C., 243 (1 Jones, Law, 1853); Leoni
T'w'p. v. Tavlor, 2o Mich. 153 (1888). The work is ministerial in character, and
they are re.ipon,,ible for negligent performance. Mason v. Fearson, 50 U. S.
9 How. 248 (18'50); County Comm'rs v. Gibon, 36 Md. 229 (1872); Dean v.
New Milford Twp., 5 \Vatis & S. 545 (Pa., 1843); Twp. v. Graver, 125 Pa. 24
(1889). The contrary'doctrine was once in force in New York (though now repudiated) as laid down in Bartlett v. Crozier, 17 Johns. 450 (N. Y., 1821), and
its effect is traceable in the decisions of some states, as seen in Lynn v. Adams, 2
Ind. 143 (2 Cart., 1850); )unlap v. Knapp. 14 Oh. St. 64 (i862); McConnell v.
Dewey, 5 Neb. 385 (1877); and Worden v. Witt, 4 Idaho, 404 (1895).
I NSURANCE-VAIVER

OF

STIPULATIONS-KNOWLEDGE

OF

AGENT-In

Western Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Marsh, 125 Pac. Rep. 1094, (Okla., 1912), it was held
that when a local agent of a fire insurance company, who has the power to accept a risk and deliver the policy is advised and has full knowledge of the fact that
other insurance upon the property is in force, and with that knowledge accepts
the premium and delivers the policy, such policy is binding on the company,
notwithstanding the fact that it contains a provision prohibiting the existence
of concurrent insurance without written consent thereto indorsdL on the policy,
and also contains a provision that none of the company's officers or agents can
waive any of its provis ions, except in writing indorsed on the policy. This decision is the first handed down in Oklahoma on an insurance contract entered
into since statehood; and in adopting this ruling the court cites in accord authorities from forty-one state jurisdictions. Morgan v. Ins. Co., 13o Mich.
427 (1902); In re M. & M. Ins. Co., 97 Minn. 98 (19o6); Spaulding v. Ins. Co.,
71 N. If. 441 (1902); Farnum v. Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 246 (189o), etc.
This line of cases is flatly contra to the rulings of the U. S. Supreme Court,
and the Massachusetts and English courts, which hold that parol contemporaneous evidence is inadmissible to contradict or vary the express and unambiguous terms contained in the instrument; the provision (as to non-waiver, and
requirement of variation to be indorsed in writing) is reasonable, and constitutes
a condition the breach of which will avoid a contract of insurance. Assurance
Co. v. Building Assoc., 183 U. S. 308 (19o0); Parker v. Ins. Co., 162 Mass. 479
(i895); Kyte v. Assur. Co., 144 Mass. 43 (1887); Weston v. Eames, i Taunt,
.115 (Eng., 18o8).
Most of the state decisions are based upon the grounds: (i) That the companies are bound by the acts and knowledge of the agents, as to conditions existing at the inception of the policy, Ins. Co. v. Yeagley, 163 Iowa, 651; (2) it
is a peculiar contract, calling for care on the part of courts to protect the weaker
party, (;rabbs v. Ins. Co., 125 N. C. 389 (1899); Barnard v. Ins. Co., 38 Mo.
App. io6 (1889); (3) prevent a fraud by allowing the company to accept benefits, and thus leading insured to believe he had protection, Young v. Ins. Co.,
45 Iowa 377 (1876); Ins Co. v. Jones, 62 III. 458 (1872); Ins. Co. v. Yeagley,
supra; Patten v. Ins. Co., 40 N. 11. 375 (186o); Wilkins v. Ins. Co., 43 Minn.
177 (189o); Allen v. Ins. Co., 133 Cal. 29 (1901).
INTERSTATE COMMERCE-ORIGINAL PACKAGE-END OF SHIPMET-In
Shaw v,. City of Atlanta, 75 S. E. Rep. 486 (Ga., 1912), it was held that an inter.,state shipment of intoxicating liquor had arrived, within the meaning of the
Wilson Act, where the vendee received delivery orders in exchange for the bill
of lading, although the liquor was never removed from the carrier's warehouse.
This is a case interpreting the Wilson Act (Act Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26 Stat.
313) which provided that intoxicating liquors shipped in interstate commerce
should, upon arrival in a state, be subject to the operation of the state laws.
In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412 (1897), it was held that there was no ar-
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rival "until arrival at the point of destination and delivery there to the consignee."
Hevman v. Rv., 203 U. S. 270 (I9O6), refused to decide whether a constructive
delivery would constitute an arrival; Adams Ixpres. Co. v. 1y., 2o6 U. S. 133
(19o6), -. id: "That the agent (of the carrier) con.-ented to hold the whiskey
(for a time) (lid not destroy the character of the transaction as one of interstate
commerce;" Louisville. etc. R. R. v. Cook Co.. 223 U. S. 70 (1911), held that
the Wilson Act does not apply before actual delivery to the consignee, and the
court cited the foregoing cases. The result of these decisions indicates that
actual delivery to the consignee is necessary to constitute an arrival.
The courts of Maine hold that the liquor has arrived if it has been delivered,
actually or conctructivelv. State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 1o6 Me. 138 (1909);
State v. Parshley, 108 -Me. 410 (19ii); State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 102 Me.
385 (1907). overruling State v. Intoxicating Liquors, 95 Me. 140 (1901), which
held that the liquor had arrived when the carrier placed it in its warehouse.
The ruling of the principal case is in accord with these decisions, as is State v.
It is to be mentioned that the latter
18 Casks of Beer. 24 Okla. 786 (19o9).
case refused to follow the rule laid down in the criminal courts of that state,
viz.: that the interstate commerce does not cease until the liquor is actually
delivered at the home of the person entitled to receive it. High v. State, 2 Okla.
Cr. Rep. i61 (I909); McCord v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. Rep. 214 (Igog). In each
case the vendee took actual possession at the carrier's depot and the seizure
which was held unlawful occurred while the liquor was being conveyed in a
wagon to vendee's residence.
MASTER AND SERVANT-ASSUMPTION OF

RisK-In Dailey v. Swift, 84 AtI.

Rep. 6o3 (Vt., 1912), it was held that a servant engaged to ice cars from a high
platform did not, as a matter of law, assume the risk of injury because of the
lack of a railing on the platform, where the master's foreman, upon the servant's
objection to working in such a place, assured him that if anything happened it
would be made right.
This is an exception to the general rule, which is well settled both in England and in this country, that an employee assumes all the ordinary and usual
risks and perils incident to his employment. Seymour v. tMaddox, j6 J. B.
326 (1851); Clarke v. Holmes, 7 H. & N. 937 (862); Priestley v. Fowler, 3 M.
& W. 1.(1837); The Serapis, 51 Fed. Rep. 91 (1892); Narramore v. Cleveland,

etc. R. Co., 96 Fed. Rep. 298 (1899); St. Louis Cordage Co. v. Miller, x26 Fed.
495 (1903). He assumes such extraordinary risks as he knows and conprebends, or are so plainly observable that he will be taken to have known and comprehended them. Ogden v. Rummens, 3 F. & F. 751 (1863); Tuttle .v. Detroit,
etc. R. Co., 122 U. S. x89 (1886); Boyle v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 151 Mas. io2
(i89o); Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Babcock, 154 U. S. 190 (1893).

The law of the principal case, however, is in accord with the weight of authority. Where the master, or the servant acting in his place, promises to
remedy the defect complained of, the servant by continuing in his employment
for a reasonable time thereafter does not assume the risk of injury from the defect,
unless the danger was so imminent that no prudent person would encounter it.
Ill. Steel Co. v. Mann, Ioo 11. App. 367 (i897); Morden Frog & Cross Works v.
Fries, 228 I11. 246 (1907); Greene v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 31 Minn.
248 (1883); Schlitz v. Pabst Brewing Co., 57 Minn. 3o3 (1894); Webster v. Coal
Co., 201 Pa. 278 (1902); Rice v. Eureka Co., 174 N. Y. 385 (19o3); Dowd v"
Erie R. R., 70 N. J. L. 451 (1904); Ilough v. R. Co., 100 U. S. 213 (1879); District of Columbia v. McElligott, 117 U. S. 621 (z886); Clarke v. Holmes, supra.
It is necessary that the promise made by the master should have been the cause

which induced the servant to continue in his employment. Eureka Co. v. Bass,
81 Ala. 200 (1886); Clarke v. Holmes, supra.
There is a difference of opinion as to what is a "reasonable time" within
which the servant may continue to work under conditions known by him to be
defective, without being said to have assumed the risk. It is said to be such
time as is reasonably sufficient to enable the master to remedy the defect, Ill.
Steel Co. v. Mann, supra; to last until it is manifest that the promise will not be
kept, Hough -. R. Co., supra. The question is one for the jury under all cir-
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cumstances unless it be clear that the time has been unreasonable, Harrison v.
Collins, 25 R. 1. 489 (1903).
NEGOTIABLE INSTRU IENTs-FORGED CIECK-A bank cashed a check on
another bank and then indorsing it had it pressented to the drawee bank which
paid it. In an action by the drawee bank to recover the money so paid, on the
ground that the signature of the maker was a forgery, it was held that under the
Neotiable In.truments Law, the drawee bank'could not recover the money.
Cherokee Nat. Bank v. Union Trust Co., 125 Pac. Rep. 464 (Okla., 1912).
A bank is presumed to know the signatures of its depositors, and it pays
forged checks at its peril. Hardy v. Chesapeake Bank, 51 Md. 562 (1879);
Frank v. Chemical Bank, 84 N. Y. 2o9 (1879). It cannot recover the amount
paid from the person to whom it has been paid, if he was a bona fide holder of
the che k. First Nat. Bank v. Marshaltown, 107 Iowa, 327 (1899); Trust Co.
v. Hamilton Bank, 112 N. Y. Suppl. 84 (ioo8); contra: First Nat. Bank v. Wyndmere, 15 N. Dak. 299 (19o6); unless by bad faith or misconduct he conzributed
to the success of the fraud or to the mistake under which the payment was made.
Nat. Bank v. Bangs, 1o6 Mass. 441 (1871); First Nat. Bank v. Richer, 71 Ill.
439 (1874). If the payee takes the check under suspicious circumstances without proper precautions, or his conduct has been such as to mislead the drawee,
recover), may be had from him. Rouvant v. San. Antonio Bank, 63 Tex. 61o
0885).
The rule that the drawee bank pays at its peril a bill on which the drawer's
signature is forged was established in Price v. Neal, 3 Burr, 1354 (1762). Although this decision has been criticised by text-writers, it is firmly established in
England and America, and is based on the law that as between parties equally
innocent the loss must remain where the course of business has placed it.
ORPH.Ns' COURT JURISDICTION-TITLr TO PERSO-NALTY-In William's
Estate, 236 Pa. 259 (1912), it was held that the Orphans' Court may issue a
preventative decree in the nature of an injunction in order to maintain the
status quo for the protection and preservation of property claimed by the estate
of the decedent, the ownership of which is in dispute.
Originally, the Orphans' Court had little pbsition or power and its decrees
carried little weight, Messinger v. Kintner, 4 Binney 97 (181x), so that it is now
conceded to be a court of special jurisdiction with its powers derived
entirely from statute. Kidder's Estate, I Kulp 412 (1875). It is a court of
Chancery within the sphere of its limited jurisdiction, Commonwealth v. Judges
of Common Pleas, 4 Pa. 301 (1846). but in respect to the property under its control, such court has full and exchsive power. Johnson's Appeal, 114 Pa. 132
(1886). It has exclusive jurisdiction to make and enforce a distribution of a
dteceTlent's estate. Musselman's Appeal, 65 Pa. 48o (1870).
Whether the Orphans' Court has authority to determine disputed questions
of title may well be doubted, yet it is undoubtedly true that it has jurisdiction
and control over as.ets which admittedly belong to the estate of the decedent.
Odd Fellow's Savings Bank Appeal, 123 Pa. 356 (t888). This is so even where
the assets of the estate are held by one whose title is only colorable. Marshall's
Estate, 138 Pa. 285 (189o); Watt's Estate, 158 Pa. I (1893). In these instances
there was no dispute that the title to the property was not in the decedent's
cetate. But where the dispute be a substantial one, until a common law court,
through a jury, shall have decided against the adverse claimant in an action to
which he has been a party, the latter may set at defiance any order or decree of
the Orphans' Court affecting the title. The mere fact that the Orphans' Court
would be powerle.s to reach any iesult in such case is sufficient to defeat a claim
of jurisdiction by way of implication. Cutler's Estate, 225 Pa. 167 (1909).
It had been judicially determined in Paxton's Estate, 225 Pa. 204 (19o9),
that the assets in the principal case belonged to the decedent's estate, but the
property had then been transferred to third parties who had a bona fide claim
of title. Creditors of the estate then filed a petition to have the assets in question re-asigned until there was a final adjudication of the estate. Though there
was no decision as to the ownership of the assets, the court decreed that the re-
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transfer be made. This seems an extension of jurisdiction which the Orphans'
Court never before made.
PROCEDURE-WVRIT OF PROIIBITION-A refusal to allow a bill of exceptions
is reiewable by a higher court where the exceptions were taken to a refusal to
is.ue a writ of prohibition. The decis.ion is put upon the ground that a writ of
prohibition is not purely a discretionary writ but is sometimes a matter of right.
Curtis v. Corni.h, 84 A.tlRep. 799 ('Me., 1912).
Where a court has clearly no jurisdiction and the defendant has objected
at the outset and has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of the law, he is entitled to a writ of prohibition as a matter of right, and
a refusal to grant it may be reviewed on error. Smith v. Whitney, 16 U. S.
173 (1885); Weston v. Charleston, 27 U. S. 449 (1829); Foster v. Foster, 4 B.
& S. 187 (Queen's Bench, Eng., 1863); Worthington v. Jeffres, L. R. io C. P.
379 (Eng., 1875).
WVhere it appears that the court whose action is sought to be prohibited has
clearly no jurisdiction of the cause originally, or where the petitioner has no other
adequate remedy, the writ is a matter of right; hut where there is another adequate remedy, by appeal or otherwise, or where the question of the jurisdiction
is doubtful or depends on facts which are not made part of the record, or where
the application is made by a stranger, then the granting or refusal of the writ is
discretionary. In re Cooper, 143 U. S. 472 (1891); In re Rice, 155 U. S. 396
(1894); In re Alix, 166 U. S. 136 (1896).

PROPERTY-RIGIUT OF OWNER TO PERCOLATING WVATERs-The case of
Garns v. Rollins, 125 Pac. Rep. 867 (Utah, 1912), discusses favorably the ten.
dency of the decisions of the last two decades to get away from the common
law rule as to percolating waters, or those found beneath land surface not flowing in a defined or known course. At the common law a land-owner had the
absolute right to take such waters, without regard to the consequences of such
taking upon contiguous property, the damage resulting therefrom not being the
subject of legal redress. Gould on Waters, § 280; Chasemore v. Richards, 2
Hurlst. & N. x68 (Eng., 1859); Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324 (Eng., 1843)
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Frazier v. Brown, 12 Oh. St. 294 (1861);
Delhi v. Youmans, 50 Barb. 36 (N. '., 1867). Even though the water taken
be wasted out of malice, Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355 (1903).
But in Smith v. City of Brooklyn, 18 App. Div. 340 (N. Y., 1897) recovery
was allowed for drying up of a pond due to the abstraction of large volumes of
water on adjacent land; and in Forbell v. N. Y., 164 N. Y. 522 (1900), where
the city installed huge pumping wells, and by collecting the water prevented
its return to the land, so that an adjoining owner's land was rendered too dry
for agricultural purposes, the rule was laid down that such was actionable injury; that the adjacent owner would be protected in his supply of water for a
reasonable use on the land. This is known as the "American" or "reasonable
use" rule, and as said in Peoples v. Carbonic Co., 196 N. Y. 421 (i9ca), obviously
resulted from a consideration of differing conditions of the age and of the possibilities of an unlimited and destructive use of modern engineering methods.
That the new rule is gaining ground rapidly is shown in Katz v. Wilkishaw,
141 Cal. 16 (1903), and five subsequent California cases; also in Water Co. v.
Farmer, 89 Minn. 58 (I9O,3); R. R. v. East, 98 Tex. 146 (1904); Pence v. Carney,
58 V. Va. 296 (1905); Erickson v. Power Co.. io5 Minn. 182 (19o8); and Long
v. R. R., 32 Ky. L. R. 774 (19o9). Two jurisdictions have, however, flatly
refused to accept the "reasonable use" rule. Meeker v. City of East Orange,
70 Atl. Rep. 360 (N. J., 19o8); and Stoner v. Patten, 132 Ga. 178 (1909).
QUASI-JUDICIAL
OFFICIAL-LIAMnL1TY-The
TORTs-NEGLIGENCE OF
plaintiff had contracted to have a third person cut and haul the timber on a certain tract of land at a certain price per woo feet. The defendant, having been
selected as "sworn surveyor," greatly over-estimated the amount so cut and hauled,
and the plaintiff brought suit to recover as damages the amount unduly paid
because of the defendant's overstatement. It was held that a timber sur'4e,/o
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is a quasi-judicial officer who is not liable for negligence, but would be liable
if he acted unfairly or fraudulently. Hutchins v..Merrill, 84 Ati. Rep. 412 (Maine,
1912).

A judge is not civilly liable for acts done in a judicial capacity, even though
n-alicious or corrupt, except in cases of courts of inferior jurisdiction in the
clear absence of all ju ridiction. Bradley v.Fisher, 8o U. S. 335 (1871); Yates v.
I ansing, 5 Johns 282 (N. Y., 18io); Phelps v. Sill, I Day 315 (Conn., 1804);
Prat v.Gardner, 2 Cuth. 63 (Mass., 1848).
An arbitrator is a quasi-judicial officer exercising judicial functions, Hoosac
Tunnel Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mas. 424 (1884). chosen by the parties themselves,
Gai-r v. Gomez, 9 Wend. 649 (N. Y., 1832). One who fixes the value of certain
property by examination only is not an arbitrator. Turner v. Goulden, L. R.
9 C. P. 57 (Eng., 1873). But if the task involves peculiar skill or knowledge,
Chambers v. Goldthorpe, (19o) I K. B. 624 (C. A., Eng.). or the hearing of evidence and the weighing of details, in re Hopper, L. R. 4 Q. B. 372 (Eng., 1867),
the person is an arbitrator.
Like other officers exercising judicial functions, an arbitrator is not liable
for error, mistake, ignorance, negligence, or want of skill or care. Tharsis Co.
v. Loftus, L. R. 8 C. P. z (Eng., 1872); Stevenson v. Watson, L. R. 4 C. P. 148
(Eng., 1879); Chambers v. Goldthorpe, supra; Seaman v. Patten, 2 Caines
(N. Y., 18o5); Phelps v.Dolan, 75 Ill90 (1874). He is protected if the
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act be within his "jurisdiction." Fath v. Koeppel,'72 "'is. 289 (1888). He is
not liable even for fraud or collusion, Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74 088o); Hoosac
Tunnel Co. v. O'Brien, supra; but compare Ludbrook v. Barrett, 36 L. T. (N. S.)
616 (1877) and dicta in leading case, in Stevenson v. Watson, supra, and in
Seaman v. Patten, supra, which impose liability.

TORTS-POLLUTION OF PERCOLATING WATERS-Oil from a leak in an oil
pipe on the defendant's land polluted the percolating water and jrendered the
well of the plaintiff unfit for use. The injury was of a temporary character.
l1eld: the defendant was liable for the injury, without negligence on his part being proved. Texas Co. v. Giddings, 148 S. W. Rep. 1142 (Tex., 1912).
Upon the principle that a land-owner has the right to appropriate all the
water under his land not flowing in marked channels, it has been held he has the
right to deprive others of the use of that water by contamination, where it was
done without negligence or malice. The jurisdictions which conform to this rule
require negligence or malice to be proved, before recovery may be had for con:aminating percolating waters. Dillon v. Acme Oil Co., 49 Hun. 565 (N. Y., 1888).
Long v. L. & N. R. R., 128 Ky. 26 (19o8). In one or two jurisdictions, the landowner s right to appropriate or pollute percolating waters is absolute and no recovery nmay be had. Upjohn v.Richland Board of Trade, 9 N. IV. Rep. 845
(Mich., I881); Greencastle v. Haglett, 23 Md. 186 (1865).
In the great majority of American jurisdictions, pollution of percolating
waters is actionable per se. Pensacola v. Pebley. 25 Fla. 381 (1889); lIlip v.
School I)irectors, 45 Ill. App. 419 (1892). The pollution is "an abiding nuisance"
so no negligence need be proved.
.

TORTS-PROXIMATE CAUE-FIREs-In Hardy v. Hines Bros. Lumber Co.,
75 S. E..
Rep. 855 (N. C., 1912), it was held that the identity of a fire set by the
defendant, as the proximate cause of the burning of the plaintiff's property, was
not lost because it (lied do*n and for several days smoldered in stumps and
other combustible material, if it finally revived and broke out afresh by reason
of contact with drv leaves, and spread to the plaintiff's property. The intervention of a considerable time and space may be considered by the jury on the
question of proximate cause, but it is not controlling.
Similarly, in tlaverlv v. Railroad Co., 135 Pa. 50 (189O), it was held that

pauses in the progress of the fire, and the lapse of time, while matters for the consideration of the jury in determining the continuity of effect, do not enable the
court to say, as matter-of, law, that the causal connection between the railroad
company's negligence and the injury to the plaintiff was broken. The fire in
this case, as in the principal case, had been thought extinguished, but nineteen
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hours afterward a wind arising caused it to spread and destroy the plaintiff's
lumber.
The doctrine of the principal case is in accord with the prevailing view in
England and in n(ost of the American states. Smith v. London. etc., R. Co.,
L. R. 5 C. P. 98 (Eng., i87o): Kellogg v. St. Paul, etc.. R. Co., 94 U. S. 469
(1876); Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson, 91 U. S. 454 (1875); Perley v. Eastern
R. Co., 98 Mass. 414 (1868); Kellogg v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 26 Wis. 223
(1870): Annapolis. etc., R. Co. v. Gantt, 39 Md. 115 (1873); Fent v. Toledo,
etc., R. Co.. 59 Ill. 349 (I87i); Poepptrs v. Mo., K. & T. R. Co., 67 Mo. 715
(1878); Cleveland v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 42 Vt. 449 (1869); Black v. Railroad,
115 N. C. 667 (1894); and Phillips v. R. Co., 138 N. C. 12 (1905). Proximity
of cause has no necessary connection with contiguity of space or nearness in
time. Cooley on Torts, p. 67.
A contrary doctrine is laid down in the cases of Ryan v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co.,
35 N. Y. 21o (1866), and Penna. R. Co. v. Kerr. 62 Pa. 353 (1869), where it was
held that a railroad company, is not liable to the owner of a house consumed by
fire communicated from another house situated at a considerable distance from
it, and which was set on fire by a spark from the locomotive of the company.
In Fent v. Toledo, etc., R. Co., supra, C. J. Lawrence said these two cases stand
alone, and are in direct conflict with every English or American case, as yet reported, involving the question. In Frace v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., I43 N. Y. 182
(1894), the court said that the Ryan case should not be extended beyond the
precise facts which appear therein; and the weight of the Kerr case as a precedent was somewhat diminished by Oil Creek, etc., R. Co. v. Keighron, 74 Pa.
3x6 (1873), and Penna. R. Co. v. Hope, So Pa. 373 (1876).
TORTS-SERvANT-EMERGEcY-A small boy who acted as helper of defendant's servant on a milk route was injured by a fall from the wagon. Having
assisted the servant to place the boy in the wagon, the plaintiff, at the servant's
invitation, was getting into the wagon to aid in carrying the boy home, when
the servant negligently started the horses, throwing out the plaintiff and injuring her. It was held that the servant, not having been employed to decide
his master's liability in such cases, had no authority in law, even in an emergency,
to invite the plaitiff to enter the defendant's wagon and that therefore no duty
which the defendant owed to plaintiff had been violated. Houghton v. Pilking.
ton, (1912) 3 K. B. 308 (Eng.).
This decision is in accord with the general trend of the authorities. It
follows Cox v. Midland Ry. Co., 3 Exch. 268 (1849) where the authority of a
station master to bind the railway for the payment of a surgeon summoned in
an emergency was denied. Contra, Louisville, etc., Ry. v. Smith, 121 Ind. 353
(1889) where a conductor was held to have authority to bind the railroad for the
payment of fees for surgeons to the extent of the agency, but no further. The
manager of a property has no implied power to bind the owners by a loan, even
if such loan is made solely to prevent the judicial seizure of the property. Hawtayne v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 595 (Eng., 1841).
Even in cases of emergency, the general rule is that one who voluntarily
or at the request of a servant goes to the assistance of such servant, is a fellowservant of the latter and cannot recover for injuries due to another servant's
negligence. Osborne v. Knox, 68 Me. 49 (1877); Longa v. Stanley Co., 69 N. J.
L. 31 (19o3); Cannon v. Fargo, 138. N. Y. App. 20 (i91o); Gunderson v. Brewing Co., 71 Misc. N. Y. 519 (1911); Wiseham v. Rickards, 136 Pa. jog (1890);
Degg v. Midland Ry. Co., 26 L. J. Exch. 171 (Eng., x857). But in some jurisdictions if the emergency be sufficiently great, Corkey Co. v. Bueherer, 84 Ii.
App. 635 (1899), certain servants have in law authority to employ any suitable
person for injury to whom, for the negligence of a servant, the master is liable.
Railroad v. Givlcy, ioo Tenn. 472 (1897); Sloan v. Cent. Ry. Co., 62 Iowa, 728
(1883). The doctrine of respondedt superior then japplies. Ry. Co. v. Bolton,
43 Ohio St. 224 (1885).
TRADE UNIoNs-RESTRAINT OF TRADE-Because of a statutory provision
against recovery of benefits from a trade union paid out of trade funds, recovery
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was refus,-d a widow who sued for -tums due her dcced-ed husband, a member of
the deftndant organization, a registered trade union with which he had insured
for many vears
Rus.ell v. Anmalgamated Societv, 8i L. J. 619 (K. B., 1912).
Prior it, the Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c. 31. trade unions in -ngland were
inc'urporated s'uie, not recounized a, legal. and illegal in that they restrained
trade and were contrary to pul,lic lolitv. llornbv v. Clo., (1867) 2 Q. B. 153.
By that Act. Sec. 3. agretments made by a trade union were declared not void
or voidablle lecause of the illegal character of the association. Sec. 4, provided
that an action could not le sus:tailnel against a trade union (inter alia) (3) (a) on
an agrement to pay out of trade funds benefits to members. Provision was
also made for the registration of the unions which enabled them to hold property,
and to sue or he sued in their regitered name.
Since the Act, in a few case.,, recovery has been had where the trade union
was sued for sick benefits to members, for the reason that, if the rules of the
association were of such a character that the association was not an organization
in rcst raint of trade, then it became legal, and quite apart from the Trade Union
Act of I871 a common law action survived. Osborne v. Amalgamated Society
of Railway Scrvants, (1911 ) I Ch. 540; (;ozney) v. Bristol Trade and Provident
Society, (19o9) 1 K. 1B.9oi; Swaine v. Wilson, (1889) 24 Q. B. D. 252. In the
last mentioned case, the fact that some of the rules of the union were illegal was
not thought sufficient to make the association illegal.
In the principal case the court refused to consider this last argument and
relied entirely on the statutory prohibition for its decision.
In America, contrary to the English rule, trade unions have been regarded
as lansful and commendable and as having the same legal footing as other social
organizations. In re Higgins, 27 Fed. 443 (1886). And the mere presence of
some objectionable features in the constitution of the trade union will not render
the whole organization unlawful. Tracy v. Barker, 46 N. E. Rep. 38.
In general, the tendency has been to attempt to except trade unions by statute
front liability for restraint of tradle, though such statutes are usually declared
uncon.stitutional, as in Chicago, W. & V. Coal Co. v. People, 114 III. App. 75
(1904).
TRIAL n

JURY-PROCEDINGS To REGISTER TITLE UNDER TInE TORRENS

I.Aw-An application was made, under a Land Registration Act, commonly
known as the Torrens Law (Rev. Laws of Minn., 1905, sees. 3370-3451) to register a title to land, which the applicant claimed to have acquired by adverse
possession. This was granted. A demand for a jury trial, however, was refused
on the ground that the proceeding was one o register title and not "an action
for the recovery of . . . specific real . . . property" to which a jury trial
was guaranteed by the constitution of the state. In re Peters, 137 N. IV. Rep. 390
(Minn., 1912).
This was a proceeding to clear up title to land; it was therefore equitable in
its nature and triable by the court and not by a jury. Johnson v. Peterson,
90 Minn. 503 (1903). But as title necessarily carries with it the ultimate right
of possession, the provision of the Massachusetts constitution that there should
be a right to trial by jury "in all controversies concerning property" was held
to guarantee a jury trial in such proceedings in that state. Weeks v. Brooks,
205 Mass. 458 (191o).
(unstitutional provisions to the effect that the right to trial by jury shall
remain inviolate are construed as meaning that trial by jury shall remain asit
was at common law at the time of the adoption of the constitution. State v.
Tre-her ('o., 40 Minn. 216 (1889). Not the form of the action, but the nature of
the cause of action is the criterion; a jury trial is a matter of right in all controversies lit to be tried by a jury, according to the rules of the common law, notvs it Ihstanting the fact that the right for the violation of which the action is brought
did not exist at common law, but was created by statute subkquently to the adoption of the constitution. Plimpton v. Somerset, 33 Vt. 283 (186o). But where
a remedy is created by statute for an injury never redressable at common law,
no common law right to a jury trial accompanies it. In re Penna. Hall, 5 Pa.
204
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OREM N'S COMII-N SATION-INA.ILIT " TO GET Est-LoV.\T"-n Ball
V. lhnt and Sons., 81 . J. 782 (If. L.. 1912). it was held that inability to obtain
employment resulting fron a difiguring accident xwas an element to be taken
into consideration in assesing compensation utnder the Workmen's Compensation Act. 1906; that the words "incapacity for work" ought not to be limited
to mere lo-ss of phy.sical power, but include an inability to find employment as
a workman resulting from the injury.
This is in accord with the trend of decided cases in England upon this subject. (lark v. Gas L.ight & Coke Co.. 21 Times L. R. 184 (C. of App., t905);
Radcliffe v. Pacific Steam Navigation Co.. 79 L. J. K. 3. 429 (19Io); Proctor &
Sois V. Robinson, 81 L. J. 641 (191). The case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall
$i L. J. 644 (C. of App., 1911) is not in conflict, for in that case there was evidence of ability to earn, qualified only by some evidence of difficulty in getting
employment, which was not connected with the fact of personal disqualification resulting from the injury.
The S-cottish decisions are not in accord with the doctrine. The case of
Boag %-.Lockwood Colliers, Lim., (91o) S. C. 51, is a broad affirnmance of the
proposition that incapacity under the act must be limited to physical incapacity
and that alone. This case was followed by the recent case of McDonald or
Duris v. Wilsons & Clyde Coal Co., 81 L. J. P. C. 188 (1911), which case, however, was treated as being governed by the decision in I3oag's case.
A workman, the courts have held, is not entitled to compensation for unemployment due to the slackness of trade, or, to tse the language of the Master
of the Rolls in Dobby v. Wilson, Pease & Co., 2 13. W. C. C. 370 (9o9), "the
employer does not guarantee the state of the labor market."

